Market disequilibrium, monetary policy, and financial markets : insights from new tools by Gaffard, Jean-Luc & Napoletano, Mauro
   
Market Disequilibrium, Monetary Policy, and 
Financial Markets: insights from new tools  
Jean-Luc Gaffard 
Mauro Napoletano 
 
SCIENCES PO OFCE WORKING PAPER n° 21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
EDITORIAL BOARD 
Chair: Xavier Ragot (Sciences Po, OFCE) 
 
Members: Jérôme Creel (Sciences Po, OFCE), Eric Heyer (Sciences Po, OFCE), Lionel Nesta 
(Université Nice Sophia Antipolis), Xavier Timbeau (Sciences Po, OFCE) 
 
 
 
CONTACT US 
OFCE 
10 place de Catalogne | 75014 Paris | France 
Tél. +33 1 44 18 54 87 
 
www.ofce.fr 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER CITATION 
 
 
This Working Paper: 
Jean-Luc Gaffard et Mauro Napoletano 
Market Disequilibrium, Monetary Policy, and Financial Markets: insights from new tools  
Sciences Po OFCE Working Paper, n° 21  
Downloaded from URL : www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/dtravail/OFCEWPWP2018-21.pdf 
DOI - ISSN 
 
 
 
 
© 2018 OFCE  
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
Jean-Luc Gaffard OFCE, Sciences Po, Université Côte d’Azur, 
Also Institut Universitaire de France 
Email Address: jeanluc.gaffard@sciencespo.fr 
Mauro Napoletano OFCE, Sciences Po, Paris, France 
Also Scuola Superiore “Sant’Anna 
Email Address: mauro.napoletano@sciencespo.fr 
ABSTRACT 
We revisit the main building blocks of the theoretical models underlying the monetary policy 
consensus before the Great Recession. We highlight how the failure of these models to prevent 
the crisis and to provide guidance during the recession were due to the excessive confidence in 
the ability of markets to coordinate demand and supply, and to the neglect of the role of finance. 
Furthermore, we outline the main elements of an alternative approach to monetary policy that put 
emphasis on the processes driving coordination in markets, and on the externalities transmitted 
by financial inter-linkages. Many elements of this new approach are captured by new classes of 
models, namely, agent-based and financial network models. We discuss some insights from 
these models for the conduct of monetary policy, and for its interactions with fiscal and macro-
prudential policies. 
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Market Disequilibrium, Monetary Policy, and Financial Markets: 
insights from new tools 
 
1. Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008 and the following Great Recession have led to radical changes in 
the conduct of monetary policy. These events were marked by the resurgence of the zero-lower 
bound on interest rates and by the implementation of several “unconventional” monetary policy 
measures. This season is now probably close to the end, with the return to a regime of global 
growth (much more robust in the US than in Europe). In face of these events, it is worth to discuss 
the elements that a new standard framework of monetary policy should include in face of the 
lessons learned during the recession. 
Indeed, none of the monetary policy responses during the crisis was inspired by the 
economic theories guiding the conduct of monetary policy before. These economic theories 
largely agreed on the idea that inflation-targeting monetary policy rules were key to stabilize 
inflation and output. They were not equipped at all to allow central bankers to prevent the crisis 
or to cope with it. This is because these models dealt neither with the effects of large recessions 
nor with the consequences of financial market strains on real activity. The crisis has thus led to a 
reconsideration of the above models and to the development of new ones that could provide 
insights to central bankers in the practice of monetary policy  (Howitt, 2012). 
In this paper we revisit the main tenets of the pre-crisis inflation-targeting consensus on 
monetary policy. In addition, we discuss three cornerstones of New-Keynesian DSGE models (see 
e.g. Woodford, 2003) underlying this consensus. We also highlight how these building blocks led 
inevitably to the failure of these models to provide guidance in face of large systemic crises, as 
they implied a strong belief in the ability of market forces to coordinate activities, and a neglect of 
the role of financial markets in the creation of money and in the determination of credit supply. In 
addition, they had no room for the analysis of the possible long-run effects of monetary policy, 
and a very little one for monetary-fiscal policy interactions. 
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We then advocate for a new approach to monetary policy that acknowledges the 
disequilibrium nature of markets, that puts at the center of the analysis the processes allowing 
good or bad coordination in markets and, finally, that accounts for the complexity of today’s 
financial markets and for their pervasive externalities. We also discuss how such a view generates 
several opposite conclusions to NK-DSGE models about the role of price rigidity and the one of 
financial markets. We also highlight how such a view implies new perspectives for the interactions 
between monetary policy and other types of policies, and even for the role of quantitative easing 
policies in normal times.  
Next, we discuss some recent advances of new modeling frameworks that have gained 
increasing attention in the aftermath of the crisis. We focus in particular on Agent-Based Models 
(see e.g. Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006) and on financial network models (see e.g. Battiston et al., 
2016). These models allow one to study several important aspects of coordination processes in 
markets, including the transmission of externalities in financial markets (and its consequences). In 
addition, these models have been able to provide several implications about the conduct of 
monetary policy, as well as for its interactions with macro-prudential regulation and with fiscal 
policies. They can thus turn useful in the building up of an effective new framework of monetary 
policy in this post-crisis phase. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main elements of the inflation-
targeting view of monetary policy. Section 3 discusses the main building blocks of the NK-DSGE 
models that provided support to inflation-targeting policies and their consequences. Section 4 
discusses the disequilibrium approach to monetary policy. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to discuss 
the advances in agent-based models and in financial network models, and their implications for 
monetary policy. Finally, Section 7 concludes.  
2. The inflation-targeting consensus on monetary policy  
Monetary policy before the crisis was guided by a consensus on inflation-targeting policies 
(see Howitt, 2012). In particular, several macroeconomists agreed about the idea that a monetary 
policy rule targeting an inflation objective was an efficient way of anchoring inflationary 
expectations and of minimizing the inter-temporal distortions resulting from price rigidities, the 
latter being the only obstacle to the efficient allocation and full utilization of resources in the 
short-run (see Bernanke et al., 2011).  
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The above consensus was firmly rooted in the results obtained with New Keynesian Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium models (NK-DSGE henceforth, see e.g. Woodford, 2003). One 
typical mechanism at work in these models is the following one. Firms anticipating a positive 
productivity shock will not lower prices as much as they should because, for example, the 
existence of costs of changing prices. The general price level will be higher than it should be. As a 
result, consumption will not increase as much as it should. Production and employment will not 
increase as much as they could. There is an inflation gap, an output gap, and involuntary 
unemployment, which result from nominal price stickiness. Moreover, “the assumed ‘stickiness’ of 
prices implies that when they are reconsidered, they are set in a forward looking manner, on the 
basis of expectations regarding future demand and cost conditions, and not simply in response to 
current conditions. As a result, expectations turn out to be a crucial factor in the equilibrium 
relation between inflation and real activity (as argued by Phelps and Friedman in the 
1960’s) "(Woodford 2003, p. 7-8). 
In these circumstances, the task of monetary policy is to correct distortions stemming from 
rational firm and consumer behavior in presence of price rigidities, and to keep the inflation rate 
constant. In particular, central banks must follow a rule implying that the interest rate is adjusted 
to cope both with the inflation gap and the output gap. For instance, in the above-mentioned case 
of an increase in productivity, the central bank must increase the interest rate, to restore the 
rationally chosen inter-temporal consumption path, i.e. the one that would have prevailed with 
perfectly flexible prices. In addition, the satisfaction of the inflation objective also guarantees as a 
“divine coincidence” (Blanchard and Galí, 2007) the achievement of the output gap objective. In 
other words, the same instrument achieves two objectives simultaneously: there is no need to 
arbitrate between price stability and growth.1  
Furthermore, in the above framework the variability of the rate of inflation is detrimental to 
the allocation of resources, precisely because of the presence of rigidities or viscosities. It is the 
intermittent and spasmodic adjustments implied by nominal price rigidities that create gaps 
between the actual price level and the natural price level, and they are therefore the main 
obstacles to the well-functioning of markets.  It follows that central banks should not care much 
                                                     
1 Blanchard and Galí (2007) also make clear that, in presence of real wage rigidities instead, monetary policy faces 
again a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing output. Rigidities (real rather than nominal) are still the 
source of the problem. For example, an increase in the price of oil requires a cut in real wages that workers may 
accept only if there is a large increase in unemployment (and a very low output). In this case, it may be better to allow 
for some inflation and a level of output above the level that would prevail in absence of rigidities (Blanchard 2008).   
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about markets where prices are extremely flexible, for example about financial markets. As 
eloquently explained by Woodford (2003) : “The prices that monetary policy should aim to stabilize 
are the ones that are infrequently adjusted, and that consequently can be expected to become 
misaligned in an environment that requires these prices to move in either direction. Large 
movements in frequently adjusted prices – and stock prices are among the more flexible of prices – 
can instead be allowed without raising any concerns, and if allowing them to move makes possible 
greater stability of the sticky prices, such instability of the flexible prices is desirable” (Woodford 
2003 p. 16).  
In this perspective, the effectiveness of monetary policy is not associated with the control of 
credit flows. On the contrary, such a control must even be discouraged, as it would result in 
detrimental distortions in resources’ allocation.  
Finally, in the framework of NK-DSGE models there is little room for monetary and fiscal policy 
interactions, except at the zero-lower bound (see Woodford, 2011). This is because if expected 
inflation exceeds the target, an inflation-targeting central bank should increase the interest rate and 
decrease aggregate demand to bring the inflation rate back to the required level. In such a world, the 
government should be reluctant to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy, as it will anticipate that any 
increase in aggregate demand driven by higher public spending will be offset by an equivalent 
reduction due to central bank monetary rule. Furthermore, the lack of monetary financing of public 
deficit will generate an increase in government debt, even larger if the monetary policy is restrictive. If 
– as a result of his dynamics - government debt solvency is questioned, then the only alternative 
become either a drastic reduction in the deficit, or debt monetization with the consequent high 
inflationary pressures. A fiscal rule constraining government deficit can be beneficial in escaping this 
unpleasant arithmetic (Sargent and Wallace 1981).  
3. The building blocks of the monetary policy consensus and their 
consequences  
The NK-DSGE models underlying the inflation-targeting consensus built on some hypotheses 
about the ability of monetary policy to affect nominal and real variables, about the faith in the ability 
markets to promote coordination of agents’ activities. Finally, these models also embed a very specific 
view of the money creation process in the economy. These critical assumptions have severely limited 
the analysis of the scope of monetary policy and it interactions with other types of policies. In addition, 
they mostly explain the inability of central banks to prevent the last financial crisis.  
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The first of the above axioms is the natural unemployment hypothesis (see Friedman, 1968) 
or, more precisely, the existence of a unique rate of unemployment that does not accelerate 
inflation. This hypothesis carries over, as a consequence, the classical dichotomy between nominal 
and real variables and, in its turn, the inability of monetary policy to affect real variables in the 
long run (in primis the unemployment rate). Several macroeconomic works have provided 
arguments for the non-uniqueness of the natural rate of unemployment rate and for its sensitivity 
to the aggregate demand level (e.g. Tobin, 1972, 1995, Diamond, 1982, see also Blanchard 2018 
for a recent account). Nevertheless, most NK-DSGE models have mostly overlooked these results, 
thus assuming the presence of a unique natural unemployment rate, determined by supply factors 
or by labor market rigidities. This has also implied, as a consequence, a sharp separation between 
the analysis of business cycles and the one of long-run growth. The first may admit some 
coordination problems, created by price rigidity in the framework of NK-DSGE models, while the 
second is determined by supply factors, and in particular by those affecting the level of total factor 
productivity. Incidentally, the level of total factor productivity is assumed to be exogenous in NK-
DSGE models, which has also implied a neat separation between the macroeconomic literature on 
monetary policy and business cycles and the one analyzing processes of endogenous technical 
change and growth (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Aghion and Howitt, 2008, Acemoglu, 2008).   
The second hypothesis is what Clower and Howitt (1998) call “the classical stability 
hypothesis”, namely the belief in the existence of some invisible hand able to coordinate all 
markets in the economy at all point in time. New Keynesian models mostly focus on the 
interaction among few aggregate variables, under the hypothesis that markets clear somehow and 
the expectations of agents are also model-consistent (see Kirman, 1992, Howitt, 2011). This 
implies removing from the analysis the very problem of functioning of markets and of how can 
actually reach good or bad coordination outcomes. However, as we shall argue more in depth 
below, accounting for the actual working of markets populated by heterogeneous agents and of 
how they can reach coordination in a state of disequilibrium, can have significant consequences 
for many key issues for monetary policy, including the uniqueness of the natural rate of 
unemployment, the interplays between the short- and long-run dynamics of an economy, the 
interactions of monetary policy with fiscal and macro-prudential policies.   
The third hypothesis refers to the characteristics of the process of money creation and dates 
back even to Wicksell (1898, 2013). It consists in the assumption that money is endogenous in the 
sense that credits make deposits, and that commercial banks fully serve credit applications at the 
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interest rate set by the central bank (see Woodford, 2003). This modeling choice reflected the 
observation that, with the liberalization of financial markets, the traditional money multipliers 
become highly unstable. It was then meaningless to focus monetary policy on the control of 
monetary aggregates.  At the same time, such an assumption has implied the removal of any 
explicit reference to the functioning of financial markets and to its consequences for the creation 
of money and for the supply of liquidity to firms and households.  Thus, it is not surprising that the 
building-up of excessive debts, which was at the root of the financial crisis of 2008, was not 
perceived as a concern by central bankers (see Stiglitz, 2011, Howitt, 2012).  
Although the hypothesis of endogenous money can hardly be questioned (see McLeay et al., 
2014, Lavoie, 2003), the actual process of money creation is far from one where banks simply 
adapt to the interest rate set by central bank and fully serve credit applications of their clients. 
Money creation (or its destruction) in modern financial systems largely results from the expansion 
(or shrinkage) of banks’ leverage, which is mostly driven by risk considerations (see Adrian and 
Shin, 2010, 2013). In addition, banks do not fully serve the demands of their clients. On the 
contrary credit rationing, based on counterparty risk evaluation and on the risk situation of the 
bank is more the rule than the exception (see Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003). It follows that the 
distribution of the risk in the financial system (Stiglitz, 2011) is the fundamental determinant of 
the supply of money and of the supply of credit in the economy.  
Nevertheless, distributional considerations were simply ruled out in the NK-DSGE models 
that were at the basis of the inflation-targeting consensus before the crisis. Since then, several 
works in the NK-DSGE literature have partially acknowledged the above problems, and they have 
developed models with financial frictions, wherein credit conditions depend on the balance sheet 
conditions of financial intermediaries (see e.g. Gertler et Kiyotaki 2010, Gertler and Kharadi 2011). 
Nevertheless, these models still overlook some key factors of instability at the root of the last 
financial crisis. One of them is the increased disintermediation of lending activities, which has 
moreover been associated with an increase in the degree of complexity of products and relations 
among actors in financial systems (see Stiglitz, 2011). As we discuss more at length below, this 
high complexity is an important source of pervasive negative externalities that are not accounted 
for by the above-mentioned wave of models with financial frictions.  
 
4. The case for a disequilibrium approach to monetary policy  
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An alternative route in face of the problems exposed in the previous section is to develop an 
analytical framework that explicitly studies coordination processes on markets that are 
heterogeneous and not in equilibrium at all times. In addition, such a framework should account 
for the fact that heterogeneity in markets may persist as a result of innovation and diffusion of 
new technologies, changes in consumers’ habits, and in agents’ expectations.  
Embracing the above disequilibrium perspective, which has strong Keynesian roots (see e.g. 
Clower, 1965, Hicks, 1974, Tobin, 1972, 1995), has several consequences for the conduct of 
monetary policy. It also leads to several opposite conclusions with respect to NK-DSGE models. 
First, one needs to consider the sluggish nature of market adjustment processes, e.g. because of 
the time agents need to acquire the necessary information and to process it. Accordingly, wages 
do not fall immediately in the face of an excess of labor supply unless a high unemployment rate 
persists.2 In that, price rigidity may favor the coordination of market activities, instead of being an 
obstacle to it. Indeed, when markets are in disequilibrium, inflation is inevitably associated with 
changes in relative prices. One problem that economic agents then face is that they might be 
unable to correctly interpret the signals that result from relative price changes associated to the 
inflationary process. Some rigidity in price formation processes may thus allow agents to anchor 
their expectations and to allow them to correctly interpret market signals (see Amendola and 
Gaffard, 2006, 2010). In contrast, excessively flexible prices may produce erratic changes in 
relative prices and thus blur the agents’ response to market signals.  In turn, this may amplify the 
effects of relative price changes and, paradoxically, it may also set the conditions for high inflation 
(see Heymann and Leijonhufvud 1995). 
Second, a disequilibrium perspective also implies discarding the idea that inflation is always 
a pure monetary phenomenon, and that central banks can control it via inter-temporal 
substitution effects produced by changes in interest rates. One needs instead to pay attention to 
how imbalances across markets evolve, and how they result from different demand as well as 
supply conditions. The latter are affected by structural change processes induced by the 
innovation and diffusion of new technologies, but also from the process of readjustment of 
productive capacities and of exit of firms following a recession (see Amendola and Gaffard, 1998). 
In addition, both demand and supply on good markets are shaped by the supply of credit as 
resulting from the banks’ leveraging or deleveraging processes, and affected by the distribution of 
                                                     
2 In addition, if one further assumes that wages and prices are more flexible upwards than downwards then an 
increased dispersion in market excess demands can also explain stagflation (see Tobin 1995). 
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risk. It is also important to stress that credit may not only allow agents to finance their investment, 
production and consumption plans, thus removing the gaps between notional and effective 
demands (Clower, 1965). It may also help to keep in existence costly trade relationships that are at 
core of the orderly functioning of markets (see Howitt and Clower, 2000). Again, all this may lead 
to quite different conclusions with respect to the inflation-targeting consensus, as it implies for 
instance the absence of any automatism between persistent low interest rates (or excessive 
government deficits) and inflation. 
Third, considering that markets are persistently in disequilibrium implies abandoning the 
idea of the existence of a unique equilibrium growth path towards which the economy converges 
in the long run. In contrast, the long-run evolution of the economy is the result of a sequence of 
short-run states characterized by discrepancies between supply and demand, which reveal co-
ordination failures (see Gaffard, 2017). This also implies breaking down the classical dichotomy 
and allowing for the possibility that the effects of monetary policy decisions have also long-run 
real effects.  
Finally, considering the dynamics of an economy as a sequence of short-run states has also 
implications for the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. In particular, the fiscal rules 
that avoid explosive government debt dynamics according to NK-DSGE models may instead have 
very asymmetric effects and plunge the economy into a highly unpleasant dynamics in a 
disequilibrium framework.  For instance, a restrictive monetary policy constraining investment (as 
it was the case in Europe in the 1990s and in the first decade of this century) may change the 
whole pattern of economic fluctuations. This is because such a policy may generate a persistent 
shortfall in investment. Accordingly, it may lower the output growth consistent with price stability 
and higher the rate of unemployment that does not accelerate inflation. In such a context, the 
introduction of a fiscal rule may aggravate fluctuations. This is because such a rule leads to a fall in 
public spending during a recession, accentuating the short- and medium-term recessionary effects 
of the restrictive monetary policy and by delaying the recovery. In contrast, during an 
expansionary phase, such a rule allows governments to lower taxes without a corresponding 
decline in public spending, thus contributing to foster inflationary pressures that can in turn lead 
to a tightening of monetary policy and to premature recessions. In conclusion, the effects of a 
fiscal rule can be very asymmetric in a disequilibrium context. No effective constraint is introduced 
in the expansionary phases of the cycle. In contrast, recessions are amplified, where the latter are 
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not interpretable as deviations from a predetermined exogenous trend, but as phases of an 
endogenous disequilibrium process that both monetary and fiscal policy contribute to determine.  
These conundrums call for a monetary-fiscal policy mix able to cope with a wrong temporal 
distribution of excess-demand and excess-supply. For instance, when a budget deficit responds to 
a decrease in aggregate demand and to a decline in economic activity, the real question is how 
long to accept a budget deficit and what should be its amount before public spending can be 
relayed by the recovery of private expenditure. In addition, inflationary pressures and budget 
deficits should not always be considered as pathological, but rather temporarily accepted when 
they are obvious outcomes of the coordination process of economies that are naturally out of 
equilibrium. 
5. Agent-based models and their implication for monetary policy 
The approach to monetary policy advocated in the previous section calls for models able to 
study coordination processes out of equilibrium and to understand their consequences. Agent-
Based Models (ABMs henceforth, see Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006) are good candidates in this 
respect. This is because ABMs represent an economy as a dynamical system of heterogeneous 
interacting agents. Heterogeneity may involve agent’s characteristics (e.g. their net worth) and/or 
their behavior of agents (e.g. their expectation rules). Furthermore, agents in ABMs can interact 
globally via prices (as they typically do in traditional macro models) but also locally via non-price 
variables (e.g. the imitation of a technology or the adoption of an expectation rule adopted by 
another firm in the economy). Another important ingredient of these models is their non-exclusive 
focus on equilibrium states. On the contrary, these models explicitly allow for states of the 
economy where some markets do not clear and/or where agents are not optimizing their behavior 
and thus have incentives to change it. Abandoning the exclusive focus on equilibrium also implies 
dispensing with the assumption of rational expectations. ABMs rather assume bounded 
rationality, i.e. agents have very simple rules of behavior for coping with an environment that is 
too complex for anyone fully to understand (Leijonhufvud, 1993). These ingredients altogether 
make ABMs very different from NK-DSGE models. The latter follows a top-down philosophy, 
wherein agents behavior obeys to conditions compatible with an inter-temporal optimal 
equilibrium path. In contrast, ABMs have a bottom-up approach. Agents are endowed with simple 
heuristics not obeying any particular inter-temporal (or model-consistent) constraint. The 
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macroeconomic dynamics then emerges as a result of the (disequilibrium) interactions among 
those agents. 
The literature on macroeconomic ABMs is rapidly growing. We refer to the recent survey in 
Fagiolo and Roventini (2017) for a rather complete survey of the different contributions and to 
Napoletano (2018) for a discussion of the implications of ABMs for macroeconomic analysis as well 
as of their limitations (and of how they are currently addressed in the literature). Here we shall 
briefly mention few examples that show the ability of ABMs to develop analyses that deal with the 
monetary policy in a market disequilibrium perspective as discussed in the previous section.  
These works shed lights on mechanisms of transmission of monetary policy (and on their effects) 
beyond the inter-temporal substitution effects that are studied by NK-DSGE models.3  Ashraf and 
Howitt (2011), Ashraf et al. (2017) and Popoyan et al. (2017) all share the same agent-based 
framework (originally developed by Howitt and Clower, 2003) consisting in an economy where the 
local interactions of heterogeneous agents following simple heuristic give rise to stable trade 
organizations and relationships. In this economy, exchange activities are facilitated and 
coordinated by a self-organizing network of entrepreneurial trading firms. The ordered functioning 
of markets and the steady growth of the economy depend on keeping such structures into 
existence. Recessions in these models arise from disruption to trade and they are costly because 
they result in the disappearance of trade organizations and in the breaking down of trade 
relationship, which are then costly (also in terms of time) to restore. In this framework, an 
increase in the trend rate of inflation leads to an increase in the long-term unemployment rate 
(Ashraf and Howitt 2011). This is because higher inflation is associated with higher price volatility. 
In turn the high price volatility exacerbates market selection and generates higher exit rates of 
trading firms and more instability in trade relationships.  
In supporting the above-described mechanisms of exchange, banks can play a “financial 
stabilizer” counter-cyclical role, especially during deep recessions, characterized by high rate of 
bankruptcy of trading firms (Ashraf et al. 2017). This is because the provision of credit helps 
incumbents to remain in business thus and keeps the remaining trading relationships into 
existence. In addition, credit favors the growth of entrant firms and thus contributes to restore 
trading relationships that were dismantled by the wave of firm bankruptcies. In contrast, banks 
                                                     
3 Agent-based models have also been used to analyze other aspects of monetary policy like the role of central bank 
learning for time-consistency problems, as well as the impact of heterogeneous agents’ learning and expectations on 
inflation targeting policies. We do not discuss these research strands here, and we refer the interested reader to the 
contributions of Arifovic et al. (2010), of Salle et al. (2013) and of Salle (2015). 
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rationing their clients have a pro-cyclical effect and exacerbate recessions. Moreover, monetary 
policy and macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy can affect the ability of the credit 
sector to dampen or to amplify bankruptcy shocks (see Popoyan et al. 2017 who extend the Ashraf 
et al. model 2017). In particular, the combination of a triple-mandate Taylor rule (focusing on 
output gap, inflation and credit growth) with a Basel III prudential regulation improves the stability 
of the banking sector and smooth out output fluctuations. And the beneficial effects of Basell III 
are mostly due to dynamic capital requirements, whereas other measures (like liquidity 
requirements) have a negative impact. These results are explained by the fact that a leaning-
against-the-wind policy together with dynamical requirements strengthens the counter-cyclical 
credit channel we outlined above. In particular, during recessions they favor the supply of credit to 
firms, thus helping to restore trading relationships. In contrast, during expansions they avoid 
excessive credit growth and thus reduce the likelihood of a wave of firm bankruptcy and, 
accordingly, of a deep recession.  
   Otherwise, the distribution of financial risk in the economy shapes credit supply and also 
firm levels of production and investment (Delli Gatti et al. 2003), and Giri et al. 2018).4 In 
particular, sudden and sharp increases of the policy rate can generate recessions (see Giri et al. 
2018, who analyze the impact of monetary policy during large crises like the Great Recession). In 
addition, after a crisis, returning too soon and too quickly to a normal monetary policy regime can 
generate a “double dip” recession. Such a double-dip recession can instead be avoided by 
anchoring the interest rate at a zero-lower bound for a prolonged period. These results thus find 
support for the monetary policy moves of central banks during the Great Recession. This is 
interesting because, as Howitt (2011) also points out, none of these policy responses were indeed 
guided by NK-DSGE theory. 
Finally, ABM models allow dealing with the issue of the short- and long-run effects of 
combinations of fiscal and monetary policy (Dosi et al. 2013, 2015). In these works, firm 
investment determines the rate of innovation and diffusion of new technologies and, accordingly, 
the long-term productivity growth rate. Moreover, the level of investment is determined by firms’ 
expectations about future demand, and it can be constrained by the credit supplied by banks. 
                                                     
4 These works belong to a stream of works in the macro ABM literature focusing on the consequences of the 
distribution of financial risk in the economy. See Delli Gatti et al. (2008) and Gallegati et al. (2017) for good collections 
of works belonging to such a research strand. 
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Monetary policy works via the debt channel by affecting firms’ ability to finance their investments 
via internal vs. external debt, and by affecting banks’ propensity to supply credit to firms.  
In this framework, the combination of a single mandate inflation-targeting monetary rule 
and of a fiscal compact rule constraining government debt and deficit levels, does not only lead to 
higher output growth volatility and unemployment in the short-run (Dosi et al., 2015). It also 
reduces the long-term growth rate of the economy. In contrast, a double-mandate monetary rule 
(including both an unemployment as well as an inflation target) is able to alleviate the negative 
effects of fiscal rules constraining government’s budget. The foregoing results thus confirm the 
insights we discussed in the previous section about the negative effects of fiscal rule in a 
disequilibrium framework, especially when this fiscal rule is coupled with a strict inflation-
targeting monetary rule.  Finally, these works show that the effects of monetary policy are highly 
dependent on the characteristics of income distribution, as approximated by the functional 
distribution between profits and wages (Dosi et al. 2013). In particular, when such a distribution is 
too much biased in favor of profits, the economy get stuck in a liquidity trap when firms pile-up 
profits that are not used to invest as their demand expectations are low (due to the low wage level 
in the economy). In this situation, the ability of monetary policy to stimulate the economy via the 
debt channel is totally ineffective. 
 
6. Endogenous money, financial networks and monetary policy 
As we explained in the section 3 above, the process of money creation and of the 
determination of credit supply to non-financial firms and households largely results from the 
leveraging and deleveraging of banks and other financial intermediaries, which in turn follows risk 
evaluation by those actors. Such a consideration has important consequences for the conduct of 
monetary policy (see Adrian and Shin, 2009). First, it implies that monetary policy should pay 
attention at how changes in short term interest rates and, relatedly, in the whole yield curve, 
affect the capacity of financial intermediaries to borrow short and lend long. Second, it paves the 
way to another important “risk-taking channel” for the transmission of monetary policy (see Borio 
and Zhou, 2012, Stiglitz, 2011), which operates via the effect that open market operations have on 
the liquidity of different financial securities and thus their ability to be used for collateralized 
borrowing by financial intermediaries. The financial crisis of 2008 has shown that a huge 
deleveraging of the financial sector can have significant adverse effects on the real economy. Such 
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a deleveraging was mainly driven by the abrupt increase in haircut rates and credit spreads on 
assets used for collateralized borrowing (Adrian and Shin, 2009, Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The 
various interventions denominated as “quantitative easing policies” were all aimed at softening 
the strains imposed by the above deleveraging process and to improve the market liquidity of the 
financial assets used as a collateral. The main rationale for these policies was given by the 
“unconventional” occurrence of the zero-lower bound constraint that limited the ability of 
monetary policy to affect credit supply via the usual interest-rate channel. Nevertheless, the 
presence of the above risk-taking channel implies that the use of these policies should not be 
restricted to unconventional situations. They should rather be part of the standard toolkit of 
central bankers also in normal times.  
However, monetary policies targeting interest rates or liquidity conditions and leverage need 
to pay attention of one fundamental feature of financial systems: its interconnectedness. Today 
the financial system is structured as a complex web of financial relationships of very different 
nature (e.g. unsecured lending, repurchasing agreements, derivatives) and among different types 
of actors (e.g. banks, hedge funds, money market, and pension funds). Financial inter-linkages can 
generate important trade-offs. On the one hand, they increase individual liquidity because, for 
instance, they can allow one financial institution to expand leverage by re-hypothecating the 
collateral obtained via reverse repos rather than its proprietary collateral (see Luu et al., 2018, for 
analysis of this channel). In addition, they can reduce individual risk via diversification (see Allen 
and Gale, 2000, and Battiston et al., 2012). On the other hand, they may generate important 
external effects (e.g. my insolvency can become yours if it causes a significant drop in the value of 
your assets), thus increasing systemic risk and generating financial crises (see e.g. Leijonhufvud  
2009, Battiston et al., 2012, Acemoglu et al., 2015).  A good deal of literature in the last years has 
developed financial network models to study the consequences of the structure of the networks 
of financial inter-linkages for financial stability (see also Chinazzi and Fagiolo, 2015, for a survey). 
This literature has highlighted two main “transmission channels”. First, shocks move from a bank 
to another via the direct interlocks between balance sheets. That is, since the liabilities of one 
bank are the assets of some other banks, the default of the debtor may be better implies a loss for 
the creditors (see e.g. Eisenberg and Noe, 2011). Likewise, in case creditors decide to hoard 
liquidity, this has negative external effects on the liquidity accruals of their borrowers. This, in 
turn, leads the latter to further hoard liquidity from their borrowers. A liquidity-hoarding cascade 
may thus start, with the result of reducing the overall liquidity in financial markets (see Gai, 
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Haldane and Kapadia, 2011, and Luu et al., 2018). Second, there are indirect connections among 
banks due to the fact that they invest in common assets (see e.g. Battiston et al., 2012, Cont et al., 
2013). This implies that, for instance, if as a result of a shock on the price of an asset, a bank sells a 
quantity of that asset sufficient to move down the price, the other banks holding the same asset 
will experience both the initial price shock as well the secondary one. They may then start to sell 
the asset themselves, thus triggering a devaluation spiral.  
Financial network models constitute an important methodological leap forward in the 
analysis of the transmission of externalities, and their results are typically not reproducible by NK-
DSGE models.  Furthermore, the results of these models have important consequences  not only 
for financial regulation (see e.g. Napoletano and Battiston, 2014, Battiston et al.,  2016, and 
Haldane, 2013), but for the conduct of monetary policy as well. First, policies changing the short-
term interest rate may trigger different responses of the financial system, not only as a 
consequence of the average leverage situation of the financial system, but also as a consequence 
of the different structure of the network of financial inter-linkages, as the latter may indeed work 
as a multiplier of the initial monetary policy shock (see Visentin et al., 2016, for a detailed analysis 
of the conditions under which an interconnected financial system amplifies or not external 
shocks). Second, financial networks have also consequences for policies directly affecting banks’ 
balance sheets and liquidity. For instance, network structures concentrating collateral flows 
among few market players generate high market liquidity in presence of re-hypothecation (Luu et 
al., 2018). It is therefore those central nodes of the network that must be targeted by quantitative 
easing policies to quickly restore liquidity following a market strain. Furthermore, one key 
consequence of interconnectedness is that the value of assets and liabilities of one institution 
cannot be evaluated independently from the value of assets and liabilities of other institutions 
that are directly or indirectly connected to it (see Eisenberg and Noe, 2001, and Visentin et al., 
2016). This is not just because of the above-mentioned practice of re-using other parties’ collateral 
to expand leverage. It is also because the securitization process has implied that several securities 
may consist of debt obligations of third parties, such bonds, securities of other banks in the same 
financial system but also mortgage-backed securities and other asset-backed securities. It follows 
that monetary policies improving the solvency or liquidity situation of specific banks, or the 
liquidity of specific class of securities, may have a beneficial impact on the value of assets’ 
portfolio of other banks and, in this way, improve their solvency, ultimately having a positive 
impact on the ability of the whole financial sector to expand leverage and to supply credit. 
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7. Concluding remarks  
We revisited the main tenets of the inflation-targeting consensus about monetary policy 
before the Great Recession and the building blocks of the NK-DSGE models supporting it. We 
discussed how the failure of these models to provide guidance during the crisis were largely due to 
assumptions that implied excessive confidence in the ability of markets to coordinate supply and 
demand and in the neglect of the impact of finance on real activities, due to a particular view of 
the role of price flexibility and of the characteristics of the money creation process. In addition, 
these models left little room for the analysis of the possible long-run effects of monetary policy 
and had a very specific view of the interactions between monetary policy and other policies. We 
then argued that a new framework for monetary policy needs to go beyond the limitations of NK-
DSGE models and in particular it needs to put emphasis on the role of processes guiding 
coordination in markets, and on the structure of financial relations guiding the diffusion 
externalities in financial markets. Finally, we discussed how these two important aspects are 
captured by new classes of models, namely agent-based and financial network models, that have 
been able to provide useful insights for the conduct of monetary policy, and to its interactions 
with other types of policies (fiscal policy, macro-prudential policy). These models may thus have a 
room in the future toolbox of central bankers.  
As a final remark, one must stress the strong links existing between banks’ leverage and, 
more generally, the organization of the financial system, and disequilibria in real markets, like the 
market for goods or the market for labor. On the one hand, disequilibria in real markets determine 
the demand for credit, which is a factor shaping the asset side of banks and their leverage.5 On the 
other hand, the supply of credit determines the ability of firms and households to finance their 
consumption and investment plans, and accordingly aggregate demand and supply. Financial 
leverage, though, is not the only factor significantly impacting disequilibria in real markets. 
Another important one, is the time horizon of banks and financial institutions in their provision of 
credit. In particular, excessive short-termism may not only be a source of bubbles and excess 
volatility in financial markets. It may also reduce the amount of financing available for long-term 
real investments. i.e. the ones associated with higher uncertainty but also with higher productivity 
gains (see Haldane, 2015).  The time horizon of financial actors cannot simply be affected by the 
                                                     
5 Following the argument of Hicks, we can also argue that, ‘the market makes its money’ (Hicks 1989). 
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level of central bank interest rates or by macro-prudential measures. In involves restructuring the 
functions of banks (e.g. separating between commercial and investment banking activities) and 
the governance of firms. These crucial issues have probably received less attention that what they 
deserve for the moment, and they need to be on the research of theoretical models dealing with 
financial-real interactions, especially the ones dealing with market disequilibria. 
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